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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals erred when it interpreted Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-
314 to require rental companies to provide indemnity protection or coverage even when 
the rental customer has "other valid or collectible insurance coverage." The Court of 
Appeals' interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-314 is contrary to the established 
principles of statutory interpretation. In addition, the Court of Appeals' decision is 
premised on a misunderstanding of the facts, and an erroneous application of public 
policy considerations. Accordingly, Enterprise requests that the decision of the Court of 
Appeals be reversed and that the trial court's grant of summary judgment be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT INTERPRETED 
U.C.A. § 31A-22-314 TO REQUIRE INDEMNITY PROTECTION OR 
COVERAGE EVEN WHEN THERE IS "OTHER VALID OR 
COLLECTIBLE INSURANCE." 
The Court of Appeals has interpreted Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-314 as requiring 
rental car companies to assume the role of a secondary or excess insurer. This 
interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-314 is not supported under the plain language 
of the statute, and is in fact contradictory to its plain meaning. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-
22-314 provides: 
A rental company shall provide its renters with primary coverage meeting 
the requirements of Title 41, Chapter 12a, Financial Responsibility of 
Motor Vehicle Owners and Operators Act, unless there is other valid or 
collectible insurance coverage, 
1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(Emphasis added.) According to the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-314, a 
rental company is released from its obligation to provide coverage meeting the 
requirements of Title 41, Chapter 12a, when there is "other valid or collectible insurance 
coverage." Nothing in Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-314 states that rental car companies 
must provide additional coverage or indemnity, or assume the duties of an excess or 
secondary insurer when there is "other valid or collectible insurance." Yet, this is exactly 
what the Court of Appeals interpreted Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-314 to require. 
The Court of Appeals' construction of Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-314 runs afoul 
of well-established rules of statutory interpretation. First, the Court of Appeals 
interpreted the unambiguous language of Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-314 to contradict the 
statute's plain meaning. See Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 502 (Utah 1989) 
("Unambiguous language in the statute may not be interpreted so as to contradict its plain 
meaning.") The plain meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-314 is that rental car 
companies are relieved of their obligation to provide coverage meeting the requirements 
of Title 41, Chapter 12a, when there is "other valid or collectible insurance coverage." 
Accepting a doubtful interpretation of the word "primary," the Court of Appeals ignored 
§ 31 A-22-314's unambiguous language and interpreted it in such a way that contradicts its 
plain meaning. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-314 removes a rental company's obligation to provide 
coverage satisfying the requirements of Title 41, Chapter 12a, when there is "other valid 
2 
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or collectible insurance coverage." This plain meaning cannot be reconciled with the 
Court of Appeals' interpretation that requires rental companies to provide secondary or 
excess coverage even when there is "other valid or collectible insurance coverage." 
Second, the Court of Appeals improperly inferred substantive terms into Utah 
Code Ann. § 31A-22-314 that appear nowhere in the text of the statute. As set forth 
above, Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-314 makes no mention of the word "secondary" or 
"excess," and contains no language requiring rental companies to provide coverage above 
and beyond "other valid or collectible insurance coverage." However, the interpretation 
of § 31A-22-314 offered by Li's estate requires that these substantive terms be inferred 
into the statute. This Court has clearly and unmistakably forbidden this method of 
statutory construction. The Court has stated: 
A cardinal rule of statutory construction is that courts are not to infer 
substantive terms into the text that are not already there. Rather, the 
interpretation must be based on the language used, and the court has no 
power to rewrite the statute to conform to an intention not expressed. 
Berrett v. Purser & Edwards, 876 P.2d 367, 370 (Utah 1994) (citations omitted). See 
also. Green River Canal Co. v. Olds. 2004 UT 106, P25 (same); Bradley v. Pavson City 
Corp., 2003 UT 16, P35 ("[W]e will not infer substantive provisions into a statute that are 
not expressly contained therein.") 
Under the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-314, and Enterprise's 
interpretation of the same, no additional terms are needed in order to give the statute 
effect. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-314 simply means what is says. Li's interpretation of 
3 
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Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-314, however, requires that additional language be read into 
the statute. Li's interpretation would require Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-314 to read as 
follows: 
A rental company shall provide its renters with primary coverage meeting 
the requirements of Title 41, Chapter 12a, Financial Responsibility of 
Motor Vehicle Owners and Operators Act, unless there is other valid or 
collectible insurance coverage. 
If there is other valid or collectible insurance, the rental company shall 
provide secondary or excess coverage meeting the requirements of Title 
41, Chapter 12a9 Financial Responsibility of Motor Vehicle Owners and 
Operators Act. 
While Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-314 does not include the second-emphasized paragraph 
set forth above, the Court of Appeals' interpretation of § 31A-22-314 effectively rewrites 
the statute to include this language. The rules of statutory construction do not permit this 
wholesale revision of statutory language. 
In this case, it is undisputed that "other valid or collectible insurance coverage" 
was available to Li's estate, and that such insurance exceeded the minimum amount 
required under Utah law many times over. See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-304. Because 
there was "other valid or collectible insurance coverage," Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-314 
releases Enterprise from its obligation to provide any additional coverage to Li's estate. 
The Court of Appeals erred when it interpreted the unambiguous language of Utah Code 
§ 31A-22-314 to contradict its plain meaning, and inferred substantive terms into the 
statute that are found nowhere in its text. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals' decision is 
4 
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erroneous and should be reversed. 
A. The Court of Appeals erred when it accepted Li's 
extrapolation of the word "primary". 
Li's entire argument revolves around a single word found in Utah Code Ann. § 
31 A-22-314. Li asserts that because the legislature included the word "primary" in Utah 
Code Ann. § 31 A-22-314, rental companies are only released from a duty to provide 
"primary" coverage when there is "other valid or collectible insurance coverage." (Brief 
of Appellee, p. 10.) In situations where there is "other valid or collectible insurance 
coverage," Li argues that the rental company then becomes obligated to provide 
"secondary" coverage. (See id., p. 11.) Again, nothing in Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-314 
refers to rental companies becoming "secondary" insurers; nevertheless, Li argues that 
this result can be inferred based on the statute's inclusion of the word "primary". 
As set forth in Enterprise's opening brief, there are examples in the Insurance 
Code where the legislature has expressly assigned "primary" and "secondary" coverage 
obligations. For instance, Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-303 provides, in relevant part: 
(b)(i) The liability insurance coverage of a permissive user of a motor 
vehicle business shall be primary coverage. 
(ii) The liability coverage of a motor vehicle business shall be secondary to 
the liability insurance coverage of a permissive user specified under 
Subsection (2)(b)(i). 
U.C.A. § 31A-22-303(2). (Emphasis added.) See also, U.C.A. § 31A-22-305(6)(c) and 
5 
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U.C.A. § 31A-22-305(10)(b)(iv).1 While Li's estate purports to acknowledge these 
instances where the legislature has explicitly assigned "primary" and "secondary" 
coverage obligations, Li's estate makes no attempt to address this point other than to say 
that the failure of the legislature to give further detail "does not favor either litigant's 
position on § 31A-22-314(1)." (Brief of Appellee, p. 10.) With this, Enterprise 
disagrees. 
Li's estate seeks to have this Court rewrite Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-314 by 
inferring additional language which appears nowhere in the text. Enterprise, on the other 
hand, simply seeks to have the statute interpreted according to its plain language, and 
without the inference of additional substantive language. Had the legislature intended to 
make rental companies into "secondary" or "excess" insurers, it would have done so by 
1
 In its brief, Li refers to the Court of Appeals' analysis of the history of Utah Code 
Ann. § 31 A-22-314, which reveals that a previous amendment to the statute specifically 
stated that a rental company shall provide its renters with "excess" or "secondary" 
coverage. (See Brief of Appellee, p. 12.) While the Court of Appeals found the 
legislative history of Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-314 to be of little help in determining its 
proper interpretation, Enterprise believes it is significant that this previous amendment, 
which specifically required rental companies to provide "excess" or "secondary" 
coverage, was expressly superceded by the legislature in a subsequent amendment that 
sets forth the current language of Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-314, which contains no 
reference to "excess" or "secondary" coverage. See Zhang, 2005 UT App 246, P9 (citing 
Act of February 19, 1998, ch. 329, § 6, 1998 Laws 1217, 1225.) Clearly, had the 
legislature intended Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-314 to mean what Li's estate has 
interpreted it to mean, there would have been no reason for the subsequent amendment. 
See Visitor Information Center v. Customer Service Division. 930 P.2d 1196, 1198 (Utah 
1997) (explaining that a change in the language of a statute indicates the legislature 
intended to change the original act.) 
6 
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using express language similar to that found in Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-303(2) or in the 
previous amendment to Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-314. The fact that such language was 
not used demonstrates that Li's definition of the term "primary" is likely inconsistent with 
that of the legislature. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-314 serves as a form of safety net to ensure that there is 
a minimum of $25,000 of indemnity protection or coverage available to victims of 
automobile accidents. If a customer does not have insurance coverage, or is mistaken 
about whether he or she has coverage, or misrepresents the existence of such coverage, 
then the rental company is responsible to provide up to $25,000 in liability coverage. 
This is the "primary" obligation under Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-314. In such situations, 
there would be no other party with a superior obligation to provide indemnity protection 
or coverage than the rental company. 
However, in situations where there is other coverage, i.e. other "valid or collectible 
insurance coverage" meeting the minimum statutory requirements, then the rental 
company is relieved of its obligation to provide coverage. Unlike the definition offered 
by Li, Enterprise's definition and application of the term "primary" gives full effect to the 
plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-314 and does not require the inference of 
substantive additional language. 
7 
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II. PUBLIC POLICY DOES NOT SUPPORT THE DECISION OF 
THE COURT OF APPEALS. 
The Court of Appeals found Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-314 to be subject to two 
competing reasonable interpretations and public policies. Li v. Zhang, et aL 2005 UT 
App 246, PI2. While a strict adherence to the established rules of statutory construction 
would have revealed only one reasonable interpretation and no ambiguity, thereby making 
the consideration of public policy unnecessary, the Court of Appeals clearly erred when it 
found there were public policy considerations favoring Li's position. 
A. The Court of Appeals unfairly interpreted the 
language of U.C.A. § 31 A-22-314 against Enterprise. 
One of the public policy considerations the Court of Appeals found supporting Li's 
position was that concerning the interpretation of ambiguous insurance policy provisions. 
The Court of Appeals stated, "as a matter of public policy, ambiguities or inconsistent 
provisions in insurance contracts are construed against the insurer and in favor of 
coverage." Zhang, 2005 UT App 246, P10 (citations omitted.) The Court of Appeals 
concluded that because Enterprise is self-insured, "statutory requirements are analogous 
to the provisions of a traditional contract of insurance and should be interpreted in favor 
of coverage when ambiguity exists." See icL 
As set forth in Enterprise's opening memorandum, the Court of Appeals' decision 
to interpret Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-314 the same as an ambiguous insurance policy 
provision not only appears to be completely unprecedented, but is also completely unfair. 
8 
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In the context of an ambiguous insurance contract, courts interpret ambiguous provisions 
against the insurer because the insurer is the party responsible for drafting the provision. 
See Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co v. Crook, 1999 UT 47, P6 ("Ambiguities are construed 
against the drafter - the insurance company - and in favor of coverage.") Unlike an 
insurer arguing over the proper interpretation and meaning of an insurance policy 
provision, Enterprise did not draft Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-314 and it would be unfair 
to treat Enterprise as though it did. 
In its brief, Li argues that the Court of Appeals' use of principles of insurance 
policy interpretation is justified because Utah Code Ann. § 41-12a-407(2) requires self-
funded persons to pay the same benefits as an insurer issuing a conventional insurance 
policy. (Brief of Appellee, p. 14.) This argument misses the point entirely. 
Requiring self-insurers to pay the same benefits as a traditional insurer has nothing 
to do with the rules of proper statutory interpretation. The Court of Appeals construed 
Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-314, a legislative enactment, against Enterprise and in favor of 
coverage. None of the reasons underlying the public policy of construing ambiguous 
insurance policy provisions against the insurer and in favor of coverage exist in this case. 
Again, Enterprise did not draft Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-314, and it would be unfair to 
treat it as though it did. 
9 
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B. The Court of Appeals' decision is premised on a 
misunderstanding of the facts and fails to recognize the 
legislature's preeminent role in setting the public policy 
underlying Utah's statutory insurance scheme. 
The Court of Appeals' decision suggests that, regardless of the amount of "other 
valid or collectible insurance" Li's estate has recovered, Enterprise must provide 
additional compensation because the estate's damages exceed the limits of that insurance. 
The Court of Appeals' opinion is premised on the understanding that Li's estate 
recovered $300,000 in insurance proceeds, but that Li's damages greatly exceed this 
amount. Zhang, 2005 UT App 246, P4. In Li's brief, we leam that this is not the case. 
Li's estate recovered the $100,000 policy limit from Zhang's liability carrier, 
American Commerce. Li's estate also sought to recover the combined limits of Li's 
underinsured/uninsured motorist coverage ($200,000) from Geico Indemnity Company. 
In its brief, Li's estate explains that while it recovered the $100,000 policy limit of Li's 
underinsured motorist coverage, it settled its uninsured motorist claim for half of the 
policy limit ($50,000). (See Brief of Appellee, p. 3.) While Li's estate contends that this 
factual clarification does not change the issues before the Court, Enterprise believes this 
clarification highlights one of the reasons why the Court of Appeals' decision is so 
problematic. 
As set forth in its opening memorandum, there has been no legal determination or 
finding made concerning the extent of Li's damages. The Court of Appeals' decision 
would necessarily require that the amount of damages be determined, in this case as well 
10 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
as any other case involving a rental company, before there can be a determination as to a 
rental company's obligation to provide "secondary" or "excess" coverage. The net result 
of the Court of Appeals' decision is that there must first be a finding as to whether a 
plaintiff has been made whole by "other valid or collectible insurance" before it can be 
determined whether a rental company has an obligation to provide additional indemnity 
protection or coverage. Clearly, this cannot be what the legislature intended when it 
drafted Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-314.2 
In addition, the Court of Appeals' decision is erroneous because it overrides the 
preeminent role and expressed public policy of the legislature concerning the appropriate 
2
 In its brief, Li argues for the first time that Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-314 is 
ambiguous in that it does not distinguish between which "primary coverage" is excused 
by which "other valid or collectible insurance coverage." (See Brief of Appellee, p. 7.) 
Li's argues that the $25,000 it seeks to collect from Enterprise is secondary only to the 
$100,000 liability coverage it recovered from Zhang, but not the $150,000 in combined 
UM/UIM coverage it recovered from Geico. Li's estate contends that the need to 
distinguish between these different types of coverages is important because, had there 
been no liability coverage available through Zhang, Enterprise's interpretation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 31 A-22-314 would allow Li's Geico UM/UIM coverage to excuse its duty to 
provide primary liability coverage. (See id., p. 9.) Li's argument here demonstrates a 
misunderstanding of Enterprise's position. 
Assuming the facts of this case were different and Zhang did not have liability 
coverage, the presence of Li's Geico UM/UIM coverage would not have excused 
Enterprise from providing liability coverage. That is because Zhang would not have had 
"other valid or collectible insurance" satisfying the requirements of Title 41, Chapter 12a. 
It is only when there is "other valid or collectible insurance" which satisfies Title 41, 
Chapter 12a, Financial Responsibility of Motor Vehicle Owners and Operators Act, that a 
rental company is relieved of its obligation to provide coverage. Because it is undisputed 
that there was such coverage in this case, Enterprise has no obligation to provide 
additional coverage. 
11 
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level of minimum coverage required under Utah law. As explained in Enterprise's 
opening brief, the Court of Appeals' decision changes the public policy of this State by 
creating a class of tort victims whose level of available compensation will depend entirely 
on whether the tortfeasor was driving a rental car at the time of the accident. The 
legislature has determined that the appropriate amount of mandatory liability coverage 
required by public policy is $25,000. See U.C.A. § 31 A-22-304. In this case, Li's estate 
has recovered insurance proceeds far beyond that amount. 
In its brief, Li's estate makes no attempt to explain why the public policy as 
expressed by the legislature in Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-304 should have any different 
application when an accident victim is injured by a tortfeasor driving his or her own 
vehicle, verses a tortfeasor driving a rental. The Court of Appeals' decision effectively 
changes Utah public policy by requiring additional coverage for accident victims injured 
by the driver of a rental vehicle. By so doing, the Court of Appeals failed to defer to the 
legislature's preeminent role in regulating Utah's statutory insurance scheme. See Allen 
v. Prudential Property and Casualty Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798, 804 (Utah 1992) (stating "[a]s 
a general matter, we are unwilling to make sweeping modifications in the public policy 
that underlies the regulation of the insurance industry in the absence of legislative 
direction. This approach is counseled by the active and preeminent role the legislative 
and executive branches have taken in this area.") 
12 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
C. The public policy supporting the "freedom of 
contract" must be preserved. 
Li executed a Rental Agreement with Enterprise in which Li expressly declined the 
option of purchasing additional indemnity protection or coverage. Specifically, Li was 
given the option of purchasing "Supplemental Liability Protection" from Enterprise for a 
nominal fee. (R. 11.) In this case, Li's estate is seeking to undo the decision Li made 
while he was alive to forego purchasing this additional coverage. In so doing, Li's estate 
seeks to contravene the public policy supporting the freedom of contract. 
Li's estate acknowledges that it has recovered "other valid or collectible insurance 
coverage" which far exceeds the minimum statutory requirements. Li's estate contends, 
however, that Enterprise must provide additional coverage as a "secondary" or "excess" 
insurer. Li's position is fundamentally flawed because once the statutory minimum 
requirements are met, additional coverage is not subject to the same exclusionary 
limitations. That is to say, Li was free to decline additional coverage in excess of the 
minimum statutory requirements mandated by Title 41, Chapter 12a. See Speros v. 
Fricke, 2004 UT 69, n. 8 ("Contracting parties are free to limit coverage in excess of the 
statutory minimum requirements."); Calhoun v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2004 UT 
56, P28 (same); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mastbaum, 748 P.2d 1042, 1044 (Utah 
1987) (holding an insurance policy exclusion to be valid and enforceable as to amounts 
and benefits in excess of statutorily mandated amounts). 
13 
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Under the terms of the Rental Agreement, Li agreed that his insurance would apply 
and warranted to Enterprise that his insurance was adequate to meet the financial 
responsibility requirements imposed under Utah law. (R. 12.) Furthermore, the Rental 
Agreement made it clear that if there was other valid and collectible insurance coverage, 
there would be no excess liability indemnity protection or coverage afforded by 
Enterprise. (See id.) 
In its brief, Li's estate ignores the fact that the minimum statutory requirements 
were satisfied by the "other valid or collectible insurance coverage" it received, and that 
the coverage it seeks to collect from Enterprise was expressly limited by the Rental 
Agreement Li executed. Li's estate has put forth no reason whatsoever as to why Li's 
decision not to purchase additional or excess coverage should not be honored. 
D. The Court of Appeals' interpretation of U.CA. § 31A-22-314 will 
negatively impact the rental industry and will result in customers 
paying twice for the same coverage-
The Court of Appeals' decision forces rental companies to provide coverage even 
where the customer chooses to use his or her own personal insurance to satisfy the 
minimum statutory requirements mandated by Title 41, Chapter 12a. If the Court of 
Appeals' decision is allowed to stand, there will necessarily be a negative impact on the 
rental industry. If rental companies are going to be required to provide indemnity 
protection or coverage, despite the customer's wishes to utilize his or her own insurance, 
the cost of the additional protection will be passed on to the customer, thereby increasing 
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the cost of renting a car. Rental customers will in essence be forced to pay twice for the 
same coverage, first to his or her personal automobile insurer, and second to the rental 
company. 
In its brief, Li asserts that the solution to this problem is for the Court to simply 
clarify what liability Enterprise is required to cover. However, one need look no further 
than to the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-314 to find this clarification: 
A rental company shall provide its renters with primary coverage meeting 
the requirements of Title 41, Chapter 12a, Financial Responsibility of 
Motor Vehicle Owners and Operators Act, unless there is other valid or 
collectible insurance coverage, 
U.C.A. § 31A-22-314(l). (Emphasis added.) Under the plain language of the statute, 
when there is "other valid or collectible insurance coverage," the rental company has no 
obligation to provide additional coverage. No added clarification is needed concerning a 
rental company's obligations under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-314 when the statute is 
read in accordance with its plain language and meaning. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Court of Appeals erred in determining that Utah Code 
Ann. § 31A-22-314 does not relieve car rental companies from providing mandatory 
insurance coverage, even when there is other valid or collectible insurance meeting the 
minimum statutory requirements. As a result, Enterprise requests that the Court of 
Appeals5 decision be reversed and that the trial court's grant of summary judgment be 
affirmed. 
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